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GOPHERS, GHOSTS, AND ELECTRONIC DREAMS: A
FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF NEW LITERARY FORMS
Jennifer Sue Boyers, M.A.
Western Michigan University, 1995
New literary forms was used as a method to show that
women writers construct notions of objectivity, subjec
tivity, reflexivity and privilege fundamentally different
than do males who are writing new literary forms.

A

narrative new literary form construct was employed and
epistemological issues were explored in a self-referen
tially reflexive way.
The history and epistemological assumptions of new
literary forms was explored in order to provide a context
for the study.

The feminist critique examined the use of

autobiography in sociological writing, looked at women
writers in the area of science studies, and explored
essentialist and non-essentialist feminist epistemolo
gies.
It was found that male new literary forms writers do
indeed employ masculine, positivistic epistemological
constructions, though they claim the contrary.

The

author offers an alternative feminist recipe to androcen
tric epistemological constructions of subjects, objects
and reflexivity.
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CHAPTER I
FORMAL INTRODUCTIONS
She Doth Not Sleep:

October, 1994

My head begins its sleepy descent onto my chest as
unfocusing eyes flap slowly open and shut.

Such is the

life of Ginny Wolf, sociology graduate student. I stub
bornly shake myself awake and put down the article I've
been studying--"Discourse, rhetoric, reflexivity:
days in the library" (Ashmore, Myers,

&

Seven

Potter, 1995)-

and head into the kitchen to make myself a mug of instant
coffee.

Many "real" coffee drinkers, my parents for

example, would call my quickly prepared concoction
11

fake 11 --a good example of the instant gratification

attitude that seems to permeate our consumer society, and
The debate is not really

my generation in particular.

about real versus fake; it is about form versus subs
tance.
Lately I've been staying up quite late at night in
order to work on my master's thesis.
in the spring of 1995.

I hope to graduate

The process of researching new

literary forms has been one of discovery and frustration;
a love-hate relationship that both begins and ends with
1

2

the very same article I find myself reviewing tonight.
When I first came to Western Michigan University, my
advisor read some samples of my writing.

As an under

graduate, I found traditional modes of writing academic
papers restrictive and somewhat boring.

So I began to

present my empirical research papers in the form of
humorous narratives.

For example, after seeing Michael

Moore's documentary film Roger & me (1989), I contrasted
the sociology of Emile Durkheim and Karl Marx by bringing
them both into the 1990s and making them assembly line
comrades in the Flint General Motors plant.
My adventures with experimental forms and humor have
become sort of a trademark of mine.

However, being

exposed to the more rigorous circles of graduate study in
sociology taught me a very important lesson:

what I

thought had been a creative and highly original idea on
my part--presenting sociology in forms that opposed
traditional modes of scientific writing--was really an
uninformed venture into a subfield of sociology known as
new literary forms. 1

No one was more surprised than I

to discover that my writing was actually grounded in a
specific historical context and tradition.

It was then

that I began investigating new literary forms in order to
better understand my own writing.

Since my first formal

encounter with a new literary forms text, the subject has
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developed into the focal point of my master's thesis.

I

still can recall the day I read that first article by
Ashmore et al.

(1995)

Women Drivers Spotted on the Information Superhighway:
January, 1994
I leave my mentor's office with an 800 page volume-
Handbook of science and technology studies (Jasanoff,
Markle, Petersen,

&

Pinch, 1995)--that could easily serve

as an effective doorstop, or perhaps as a murder weapon
in an old Hitchcock film.

Prior to the book's publica

tion, my mentor--who also happens to be one of the book's
editors--has complained about the editorial process for
the last six months.

It seems to me that process should

be the important element in scholarship, not the finished
product.

He also tells me that several professional and

personal relationships broke up during the course of
producing the text.

It sounds more like a boxing match

to me than a cooperative, scholarly endeavor.

When I

commented on this to him, my mentor told me (using mascu
line imagery) that in "real" scholarship one has to deal
with blood and guts.
I sigh with despair.

As if I didn't already have

enough things to do today, now I have to go to the li
brary to copy an article on discourse analysis from the
handbooK (Jasanoff et al., 1995).

My advisor wants me to
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become familiar with the new literary forms literature,
and the Ashmore et al. (1995) article contained in the
handbook is an exemplary piece.

I understand that dis

course analysts treat scientific texts as if they were
literary texts--entities in and of themselves (Ashmore,
1989, p. 46)--but I don't understand the connection with
new literary forms.
I can already tell this is going to be a hellish
day!

The winter sky looms gray and dreary as I pass

below the clock tower that is a part of Waldo Library.
With its tile facade, that strange timepiece reminds me
of a hard, cold bathroom floor--the kind of floor that
freezes your feet in the morning after a long night of
slumber in a warm, comfortable bed.
dering:

I find myself won

what is the purpose of form if it conjures

unappealing images?

I pass a young woman sitting on a

bench outside of the library, warming her hands with a
steaming cup of coffee.

As the aroma hits my nostrils, I

wonder if she is drinking the real or the fake variety .
I head into the library and up to a secluded table on the
second floor to read the Ashmore et al. (1995) article.
I think to myself that I could spend seven days in Waldo
Library just reading this handbook (Jasanoff et al.,
1995).

I take my seat and decide to browse through the

book before I begin reading.

Some of the articles look
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interesting, but overall, the titles lead me to believe
most of them are probably boring.

A small yawn escapes

from my mouth, as I settle down to read the Ashmore et
al. (1995) article.

At least their title is creative and

holds the promise of an interestin9 piece of work.
An hour later I finish the last words of the article, my eyes riveted to the page--my first reading of a
new literary form.

In fact, one could even say the

authors employed a new literary form to describe new
literary forms.

The authors, all British and all male,

. and create a female stu
take on the "Other" as subject
dent working on her dissertation.

This nameless woman

conducts her literature review over the course of seven
days spent in the library, and records her thoughts and
findings in a diary; this diary provides the text of the
article.

I ponder a moment to consider the significance

of a diary as an exclusively women's forum.
The fact that the woman is not given a name in the
article really bothers me.

However, upon reflection, I

realize that I should not be so surprised by her name
lessness.

It is a cultural norm in this country for

women to be nameless, or to take a man's name in mar
riage, which is the same thing.

Women lose their names

every day when they enter into a traditional Western
marriage--Nancy Ellis Traphagen becomes Mrs. Dale Boyers
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with the mere giving of a ring and the recitation of
In the Bible we read of "Lot's wife" and "Noah's

vows.

wife"--nameless women (Lagerwey, 1994).

Since we base

our society on patrilineal descent, I guess it follows
that a woman could be represented as nameless.

So, in a

sense, the nameless woman of the article is a very real
character; she is a woman who lacks a very basic source
of identity--her own name.
this thought.

I scratch my chin and ponder

Trying to recall a text I've read that

contained nameless male characters, I realize I can think
of none.
On the other hand, the nameless woman is an entirely
fictional creation, as she is also stripped of any physi
cal descriptors.

She is faceless and without a body.

Where are the big, pendulous breasts; the creamy, white
thighs?

I would argue that the authors' choice to create

a bodyless woman is very unusual, especially in this day
and age, where women's bodies are constantly objectified.
I begin to dwell on the issue of names and cannot
envision myself ever giving up my name in a marriage.
The thought of a traditional wedding ceremony conjures
such horrid images for me that I decide to take a break.
I leave my things at the table and begin walking around
the library.

I find myself down on the first floor by

the on-line computer search systems.

Deep in thought, I
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don't notice the strange beeping sound at first.

Eventu

ally I become aware of the annoying tone emanating from
one of the computer modules.

I trace the sound to its

source and quickly sit down in front of the monitor to
see if I can stop the noise.

Much to my chagrin, the

blank screen suddenly falls silent and a strange message
appears followed by an equally strange drawing:
TO: X93WOLF@WMICH.EDU
FROM: GEEZER@KZOO.NLF
DATE: January 17, 1994
RE: New Literary Forms
EMAIL> "Beware of theories that naively assume
the truth of your own knowledge and the falseIgnore theories
hood of everyone else's .
of knowledge that do not give proper explana
tion of why we believe, but merely explain it
away" (Dean, 1978, p. 287).
Sincerely, Pro
fessor Geezer (Ashmore, 1989, p. 15).
I am struck by the strangeness of the letters and
symbols that serve as our addresses.

Perhaps that is

part of my disdain for using electronic mail.

I consider

e-mail to be the quintessential new literary form:

pure

substance without concrete form.

It is a disembodied

jumble of neat, typeset letters.

Where is the original

script of each individual author?

Where is the personal

quality of the stationary, the colorful paper, the unique
signature of the author?
hell sent me this message?

Where is the humanity?

Who the

Several thoughts and ques

tions race through my mind as I study the very ambiguous
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message and the interesting drawing that were meant for
me to see.
The drawing is of two hands; a real hand draws a
picture of a hand, which looks exactly like the real hand
doing the sketch.

As I look closer, it strikes me that

the hands depicted in the drawing are undoubtedly male
hands.

Since this is a visual display of reflexivity, am

I to glean some sort of message concerning masculinity
and reflexive practice?
stand.

I'm not sure.

I do not under

I do not know anyone named "Professor Geezer."

I am not very familiar with e-mail.

I like to refer

to myself as "lost-despite-a-map on the information
superhighway." I can read most of the signs, but I just
cannot seem to get to where I want to go.

I am competent

enough to learn to use technology, in fact, I am very
skilled with a computer.

However, my reasons for shun

ning many forms of technology have more to do with prin
ciples than practice.

For example, I have purposely

refused to use e-mail, as I find it very impersonal and
mechanical.

I don't even like to type letters to people,

let alone send them over invisible airwaves.
happened to pen and paper?

Whatever

What about the good old card

catalog, which allowed one to actually touch concrete
information?
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I continue to read and re-read the message--the
context of the meaning escapes me.

The drawing is fasci

nating, though I find it to be thoroughly masculine in
its imagery.

Someone is attempting to give me some

information relating to new literary forms, but I don't
quite see the connection.

But how would anyone know I

was here, at this particular terminal, at this specific
time?
The obnoxious beeping sound begins anew.

Perhaps it

is Professor Geezer again, with some more information on
new literary forms!
computer screen.

I eagerly direct my attention to the

Sure enough, another message appears on

the terminal:
TO: X93WOLF@WMICH.EDU
FROM: GEEZER@KZOO.NLF
DATE: January 17, 1994
RE: Acquisition of Ashmore Text

EMAIL> I know you are researching new literary
forms for a possible master's thesis. I have
taken the liberty of sending you the seminal
text written on new literary forms, as it is
very difficult to find in the United States.
Ginny, a copy of The reflexive thesis (Ashmore,
1989) is enroute to your apartment, via UPS. I
hope that this text will provide you with suf
ficient information to allow you to begin your
quest into the wonderful world of new literary
forms. And, being the feminist you are, I'm
sure you'll find some relevant connections.
Good luck! I will be in touch again soon.
Professor G.
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New Literary Forms Revealed
The book came the next day via United Parcel Ser
vice--this mode of communication I do understand.

I

eagerly bury myself in the text and begin wildly marking
notes to myself in the margins.

Malcolm Ashmore is a

sociologist.

I find the reading to be very enjoyable and

fascinating.

I notice that Professor Geezer has left me

a list of call numbers to go with each section of the
book.

Am I to look these up as supplemental texts?

It

seems very strange and spooky to me that a complete
stranger is sending me semiotic signs, not to mention the
fact that he somehow knew exactly where I was when the e
mail messages were sent.

I

pause in my reading a moment

to further ponder this mystery, but after glancing at the
clock I discover I have been reading and note-taking for
almost- three hours, and I am famished!

I wander into the

kitchen, but not before closing my bedroom drapes and
rechecking the dead bolt on my front door.
be too careful these days.

A woman can't

I have a poem up on my re

frigerator, given to me by a woman friend, that equates
privilege with being able to go out at night and not fear
being raped by men.

Danger lurks outside, because with

the liberation of the feminist movement comes the violent
male backlash.

Plus, this strange situation with the

unknown Professor Geezer has made me extra cautious.
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What I really want is a big, fat, juicy burger from
McDonald's; what I prepare is a fat-free, vegetarian
burger with artificial meat flavoring from my freezer-
another tasteless alternative form.

Why do I eat things

I place a hand over my somewhat flat stomach

like this?

and imagine myself twenty years from now with a roll of
flab in its place, created primarily from the high fat
content of McDonald's hamburgers--the "McDonaldization of
Society" (Ritzer, 1993) . 2

I scan the vegetarian burger

package for its fat content--one patty, 2% fat--and
decide that I have made the smart choice.

But I do not

enjoy the meal, as I am thinking the whole time that
women do not feel comfortable with their bodies because
men also control the imagery that dictates the standards
of feminine beauty.
male hands .

My mind again drifts back to the

. where are the big, pendulous breasts;

the creamy, white thighs?
After my meal I take a brisk walk outside to clear
my head of all the conflicting and disturbing thoughts
running rampant.

But I am not alone; I bring with me my

pepper spray and my body alarm to be prepared for the
backlash.

The sky is still colorless, but the sun is

attempting to peak through the gloom and I am content
with this.
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I return to my apartment and throw myself back onto
my bed to continue with my reading--! make a mental note
to someday buy myself a desk.

I take a moment to reflect

on the fact that I do all of my studying (and eating) on
my bed.

Would a man study while lounging on his bed?

he did, would he admit it to people?

If

I think not.

Somehow the image of the scholarly male researching his
thesis while reclining back upon two fluffy pillows does
not seem probable within the field of positivistic sci
ence as we know it today.
I spend the next week reading and compiling notes,
both at my apartment and in the library.

I research the

call numbers--which were indeed supplementary information
to the Ashmore (1989) text--and regularly check the same
computer at which I received my initial e-mail messages.
Strangely enough the Professor sends me no further infor
mation.

Reflecting on my work after the seventh day of

researching, I come to see that the fictional woman from
the discourse analysis article (Ashmore et al., 1995) and
I have one important thing in common--we both spend seven
days in the library, as directed by unknown, unseen male
authors.

Even God was allowed one day of rest!

I understand now how discourse analysis is tied to
new literary forms, and how both of these "programmes"
(programme being a British synonym for methodology) come
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out of sociology of scientific knowledge (SSK) work
(Ashmore, 1989, p. 46).

I rather like this field of

study and its corresponding tenets.

Both new literary

forms and discourse analysis have their origins in Brit
ish SSK research from the early 1970s (Ashmore 1989, p.
3).

Sociology of scientific knowledge was concerned with

deconstructing the terminology of the scientific method.
For example, SSK practitioners questioned terms such as:
discovery, proof, replication, problem, fact, observa
tion, and application (Ashmore 1989, p. 13).

Practition

ers of SSK believed that the natural sciences, as well as
the social sciences, could be deconstructed, as they both
generate socially constructed knowledge (Woolgar
more, 1988, p. 1).

&

Ash

As Ashmore so eloquently puts it:

"even the most esoteric features of scientific and mathe
matical knowledge can be understood as social constructs.
. No kind of knowledge need be exempt from critical
scrutiny" (Ashmore 1989, p. xvii).

Though practitioners

of SSK do not seek to answer the "One Big Question" in
sociology--"Can and/or should the social sciences be like
the natural sciences" (Ashmore 1989, p. 7)--they do
strive to present a different (some would say critical)
picture of the natural sciences and the methods used by
its followers (Ashmore 1989, p. 7).

This process is
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frightening to some social scientists, as well as to many
members of SSK (Trigg, 1978, p. 291):
At first sight, the admission that sociological
explanations are probably only the product of
the social milieu of those putting them forward
undermines their authority. Why should anyone
in those circumstances pay any more attention
to sociologists than, say, witch doctors?
For the most part, mainstream sociology has neither
recognized nor supported the subdiscipline of SSK.

I am

surprised to learn that many of the early SSK practition
ers were not sociologists, but not surprised to find that
they were (and still are) all men (Ashmore, 1989, pp. 1625).

According to Ashmore (1989), included among SSK

practitioners were physicists, mathematicians, philoso
phers, astronomers, psychologists, and anthropologists
(p. 11).

Just as SSK became a multi-disciplinary endeav

or, it also spread out of Britain into France, Germany,
the Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and the United
States 3 (Ashmore 1989, p. 11).
Perhaps the biggest issue in SSK--and by associa
tion, new literary forms--is that of reflexivity, or "the
willingness to probe beyond that level of straightforward
interpretation" (Woolgar, 1988a, p. 14).

Now I totally

understand the relevance of the drawing the Professor
sent me on that first day!

Is the advocacy of reflex

ivity in the social sciences desirable?

Ashmore's book

is an exploration of how different SSK practitioners
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conceive of and practically manage reflexivity in their
own work (Ashmore, 1989, p. xxiii).

I understand now

that writing new literary forms is one very creative
strategy for dealing with, and advocating, reflexivity in
the social sciences.

More specifically, new literary

forms operates as a method to allow writers to actively
incorporate reflexivity into their social science work.
According to Ashmore (1989, p. 83), the "advocacy of new
literary forms as an essential aid to an authentic re
flexive practice" is an effective way to integrate re
flexive practices into social science writing.

The issue

of reflexivity is also an inherent component to discourse
analytic work.

Some analysts are even working with

analyzing discourse analysts' discourse (Ashmore, 1989,
chap. 5).

As shown in the Ashmore et al. (1995) article,

discourse analysts also find new literary forms to be a
very attractive method for incorporating reflexivity into
their writing.
The backbone of the new literary forms movement is
the belief that the "format of the standard empiricist
research report inhibits the development of any serious
and sustainable reflexive practice .

therefore other

alternative formats are to be preferred" (Ashmore, 1989,
p. 66).

Among the various experimental genres that have

been used are:

plays, limericks, parodies, parables,
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dialogues, anti-prefaces, anti-introductions, parallel
texts, lectures, press reports, and self-engulfing photos
(Ashmore 1989, p. 66)

(For one of my favorite new

literary forms tools, and an example of its use, see the
Endnotes section. 4)
I am absolutely intrigued by the possibilities of
this alternative method.

However, after much research

and reading on the topic, I am perplexed by the absence
of women authors and women's perspectives in the new
literary forms literature--Professor Geezer was right.
After re-reading the Ashmore et al. (1995) article, proud
and observant feminist that I am, I realize that I am
still extremely bothered by Ashmore et al.'s (1995) use
of the nameless woman in their article.

If one replaces

her with a male character, the entire diary format falls
apart; the new literary form is rendered ineffective.
The authors explain on page 323 that the character
"need[s] to be gendered," and I agree.

One should not

necessarily aim for gender neutrality or androgyny in
writing, i.e., to effortlessly replace "her'' for "him"
and have it retain the same meaning.

However, I feel

that these male authors stereotyped much of the woman's
character and, in the process, caused the text to read in
a very cutesy and negatively gendered way.
how all of these gender issues interact.

I am not sure
However, I
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decide definitely, on that very day, to do a feminist
critique of the new literary forms movement.
She Sleeps:

October, 1994

I end my reminiscence of the origins of my present
thesis, which is indeed a feminist critique of new liter
ary forms, by placing the Ashmore et al. (1995) article
on the nightstand beside my bed.
much too late.

Again I have stayed up

I stumble into the kitchen to rinse out

my coffee cup before I brush my teeth for bed.
alarm for 6:30 a.m. and turn out the light.
trouble relaxing my mind for sleep.
every thirty minutes:
turn.

I have

I look at the clock

1:20, 1:52, 2:20.

It seems I will never

I set the

. get .

I toss and
. to sleep.

I am driving down the Information Superhighway, also
known as U.S. 101, in the middle of the night.
seems to envelope the car.

Blackness

I become aware that there are

other people in the car with me--two women.

I instinc

tively know that the person beside me in the passenger
seat is my foresister--Virginia Woolf.

I have always

fancied that my father's name is a derivative of Woolf,
and that Virginia is truly a blood relative.

She is a

comforting presence, though I cannot clearly see her
face, only a shadow.

There is a younger woman in the

backseat; I look in the rearview mirror and cannot seem
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to find her, yet I know she is there.

It is comforting

to have women in my presence.
"Hey you!

I ask aloud:
you?"

In the backseat!

Who are

I can see some movement in the mirror, but no

definite human form emerges from the darkness.
"I am a woman; I am nameless.

quietly replies:

fictional character from your readings.

She
I am a

Please take me

to the library."
We drive in silence for a few moments as I prepare
to take the proper exit leading to the Western Michigan
University Library.
it is Virginia's.

Suddenly a chilled hand covers mine;
She forcefully deters me from taking

the exit as she brusquely says:
seven whole days in the library.
deserves a break?''

"She has already spent
Don't you think she

I could see her point, but I decided

to acquiesce to the backseat woman's request.
A couple of miles down the highway, I see the light
of the moon reflecting eerily off the tile facade of
Waldo library.

I pull of the highway and drive into a

parking space to let the woman out.

But suddenly, the

glowing yellow lights were not attached to the library,
but mutated into the glowing yellow arches of McDonald's.
We are no longer in a parking lot, but at a drive-thru
window.

Since we are there, I decide to order a Big Mac

with cheese, large fries and a large coffee; the other
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women remain silent.

As I pay at one window and then

pull up to another to receive my food, I notice the
restaurant's logo on an employee's shirt:

"If you want

form, go to Burger King--we are 100% substance."
hands me my order in a plain, gray paper bag.

A woman

I open it

up and find inside a vegetarian burger with artificial
meat flavoring, a lettuce salad with diet dressing, and a
large cup of hot water next to a small jar of Maxwell
House instant coffee.

I take a byte of the burger and

spit it out in disgust.
I become angry and begin banging on the drive-thru
window that has been shut tightly--nobody answers.

The

lights inside the restaurant go dim and finally fade to
black.

My car mysteriously shifts into gear and takes

off, full speed ahead, back onto the Information Super
highway.

The car is accelerating faster and faster, and

as I tightly latch my seatbelt, I notice that I am sud
denly alone in the car.
I have entered a world of virtual reality.

Body

pressed full back against the seat from the tremendous
force of the speeding car, I begin crying.

I think I

must be hallucinating, as e-mail messages float disembod
ied through the air, gophers attempt to burrow into my
car through the floorboards, information hijackers carry
assault weapons, and computer terminals go racing by
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close to my window.

The masculine hands of reflexivity

knock menacingly and insistently at my window.

I close

my eyes in terror and continue crying.
I open my eyes just a crack to find the median
littered with McDonald's hamburger wrappers and large,
empty coffee cans.

Virginia Woolf appears beside the

speeding car, floating alongside and yelling out advice-
she has transformed into a ghost, a disembodied spirit.
"Go to it!

You must get the word of the sisters out.

your feminist critique, do it now!"

Do

I try to respond to

her, but it seems I have lost my voice.

She suddenly

stops and as I glance into my rearview mirror, I see that
she quickly recedes from view and then dissipates.
My head is spinning from the intense speed of the
car.

It doesn't seem possible, but I feel I am now going

faster than ever before.

My eyes roll up into my head

and I become faint with nausea.

My world begins spiral-

my voice returns and I hear

ing and careening .
myself screaming .

Suddenly I am wide awake, sitting bolt upright in my
own bed--back to real reality.

Sweat is dripping from

every pore and my pulse is racing.

That was some night

mare, I think to myself as I wipe the sweat and stink
from my underarms.

Virginia Woolf is my feminist being,

my link with the past.

And the entire horror of the
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Information Superhighway and the McDonaldization of
society must represent the alienation I am experiencing
in the modern world.

The imagery from the dream ties in

nicely with the feminist critique I seek to do of new
literary forms, which originated as a process that al
lowed writers to break out of the formal, dehumanizing
form of traditional, positivistic sociology--to break
free of the alienation.
This must be similar to what Native Americans expe
rience when having a "vision."

Concepts and ideas sud

denly become clear in my head.

I can envision the con

tent of my thesis in my head.

I must write it down!

I

leap out of bed and run to get myself a legal pad to
write on.

Back in bed and propped up against my pillows,

I outline the remainder of my thesis.
I finish my outline with a deep sense of accomplish
ment, and decide to take a hot bath to relax myself for
sleep, which will most likely be impossible because I am
so wound up right now.

As my bathwater runs I go out to

the kitchen and open up the refrigerator:
milk, pop.

Nothing cold sounds good.

juice, wine,

I close the door

and walk over to the cupboard; some steaming decaffeinat
ed coffee would taste nice.

I reach for the instant

granules and decide against them.

Instead, I get down

the dusty old percolator that my mother gave me, and open
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up a bag of Dark French Roast whole coffee beans that I
didn't realize I had.

I even find a coffee grinder way

in the back of a junk drawer.

For some strange reason I

feel like drinking "real" coffee this time.

I rest

against the counter and wait, patiently, for my coffee to
brew.

CHAPTER II
THEORY AND REMEMBRANCE
Reminiscence With Biography:

November, 1994

When I was a girl living under my parents' roof,
things were much easier.

I remember what I did when I
I

became upset, or when I felt stressed out from school:

went into my very own bedroom, shut out the world behind
a tightly closed door, and turned up my record player
(later on it became a tape recorder, and then a portable
1

stereo, and now it is a compact disc player).

Listening

to my favorite musicians, I would drift far away into a
rich fantasy world of dancing and singing.

Of course the

boys I happened to be interested in at the time were
always in these fantasies.

I would be a very sassy,

strong and sexy singer/dancer, and all of my favorite
people--teachers, parents, friends, beaus, even famous
people--would come and watch me perform, all the while
admiring me for my appearance and my talent.
Sociologist George Ritzer (1992, p. 524) advocates
the use of biography and autobiography in sociology.
writes:

He

"Biographical and autobiographical work is

useful in helping us understand the work of sociological
23
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theorists, and of sociologists generally" (Ritzer, 1992,
p. 524).

Feminist sociologist, R. Ruth Linden, pairs her

own autobiography with stories of Holocaust survivors in
her book Making stories. making selves (1993).

She

contends that biographies and life histories "represent
moments--sometimes crucial, sometimes not--when people
remember and reinterpret themselves" (1993, p. 139).
Perhaps my own longing for fantasy is part of my attrac
tion for the new literary forms genre, for new literary
forms allow me to present empirical findings as well as
add those very important elements of creativity, even
fantasy.

The concerns that inform and underlie my femi

nist critique of new literary forms, in part, involve the
differential ways in which women and men write about
their findings and structure their creativity.
It is almost Christmas time and I have yet to dis
cover who the mystery person is who communicated with me
by e-mail.

I'm progressing nicely with the first Chapter

of my thesis, and am currently working on the theory
section of the second Chapter.

I have researched more

extensively the issue of reflexivity in new literary
forms.
Even after reading other authors who deal with new
literary forms, I find myself continually referring to
Malcolm Ashmore's (1989) text.

I greatly respect and
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admire his work.

He returns to the origins of new liter

ary forms--the sociology of scientific knowledge--and
gives a very good overview of the most prominent theoret
ical stances concerning reflexivity.

Ashmore's (1989, p.

xxiii) own belief is that reflexivity need not be prob
lematic.

He believes that the social sciences are "im-

plicitly self-referential" (1989, p. 32), but in most
cases, this reflexive character is essentially latent.
He outlines three differing management strategies used by
SSK scholars to deal with reflexivity (1989, p. xxviii):
(1) some see it as a threat,

(2) some use it as a criti

cal tool, and (3) some see it as an opportunity.
Many SSK scholars follow the paths of tenets 2 and 3
(as does Ashmore), seeing reflexivity as an opportunity
and a critical tool that will allow the social sciences
to grow.

For example, SSK scholar Ray Holland (1977, p.

267) is an advocate of reflexivity, positing that a
theory should be able to account for itself, e.g., how it
was produced.

Holland (1977) also sees the liberating

qualities associated with reflexive practice:
Sociology may now have overcome its imprinting
on mistaken parent figures--the natural and
physical sciences--so enabling it to recover
its history, its subject matter and most power
ful analytic tools: it has come of age. The
condition of this emergence is a strong sociol
ogy of knowledge capable of turning sociology
upon itself in continuous criticism and collec
tive self-reflection--reflexivity at last. (p.
271)
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As critical theorist Theodor Adorno contends, "It be
hooves a sceptical science to adopt an attitude of scep
ticism towards its own ascetic ideals" (Adorno, 1976, p.
252)
Other SSK practitioners also have something to say
concerning reflexivity.

David Bloor's (1976) "strong

programme" in SSK, perhaps the best known in the field,
incorporates reflexivity into the fourth tenet of his
theory, along with symmetry, impartiality, and causality
(pp. 4-5).

The programme of Barry Barnes (1974) implic

itly calls for reflexive practice because, as Ashmore
points out, it "treats science as a form of culture just
like any other" (1989, p. 8).

Sociologists Nigel Gilbert

and Michael Mulkay (1984), creators of the P.rogramme of
discourse analysis, entertain what Ashmore refers to as
an "implicit reflexivity" (1989, p. 46), as well as a
"positive reflexivity" (1989, p. 42).

Perhaps Mulkay

(1985) said it best when he so eloquently wrote:

"the

self-referential character of the sociological analysis
of discourse is not something to be rejected or hidden,
but rather to be welcomed and celebrated" (p. 155).
There is a division within SSK between those who
view reflexivity is an opportunity and a critical tool,
and those who feel it is a threat.

Ashmore presents some
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remarks from those who oppose reflexivity.

The following

quotes from SSK scholars Harry Collins and Bruno Latour,
are taken from direct transcripts of correspondence and
interviews with Malcolm Ashmore.

Collins, with his fiery

rhetoric, believes that reflexivity is "paralysing be
cause you spend so much time looking up your own anus"
(Ashmore, 1989, p. 20).
and forcefully states:
more, 1989, p. 22) !

He then goes one step further
"I just ban reflexivity" (Ash-

Latour, on a more practical note,

claims that, "Given the pressure of a scientific career,
reflexivity is equivalent to suicide" (Ashmore, 1989, p.
24).

SSK practitioner Trevor Pinch, along with Collins

(1982, p. 190), reject the basic premise of reflexivity
and would like to similarly outlaw reflexive practice
because of the difficulties it creates in the work of
science.

And fellow SSK scholar Martin Hollis, in his

article entitled "The social destruction of reality"
(1982), attacks Bloor's strong programme, contending
that, "Self-reference is an embarrassment, not a selling
point" (Hollis, 1982, p. 81).
Despite these oppositions to reflexivity, ethnometh
odologists Hugh Mehan and Houston Wood (1975, p. 159)
contend that reflexivity has proven itself and is here to
stay: "There could be infinite sayings about reflexivity,
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and still reflexivity would not be captured.

Reflexivity

will exhaust us long before we exhaust it."
Though many of the SSK practitioners "accept reflex
ivity in principle" (Ashmore, 1989, p. 26)--for example,
Barnes and Bloor--for the most part, reflexivity seems to
have little practical application in their work.

On the

other hand, SSK practitioners such as Ashmore, Latour,
Mulkay, and sociologist Steve Woolgar "have made various
attempts to incorporate the serious recognition of re
flexivity into their analytic practices" (Ashmore, 1989,
p. 26).

Hence, the new literary forms movement was born

-not from the wombs of women, but from the minds of men.
An image of the Greek goddess, Athena, being born from
the head of her father, Zeus, fills my mind.

The absur

dity of the metaphor makes me laugh.
Real Reflexivity, Artificial Trees:
December, 1994
I go to my parents' home in Jackson--home of the
state prison--my childhood home, for Christmas.

I con

sider myself a writer and hope to someday write my mem
oirs for future generations to read.

I've kept a journal

(I have consciously refrained from calling it a diary
because of the gendered implications of that word) since
I was in sixth grade, and I carry it everywhere when I
travel.

The Christmas holiday is no different.
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After the holidays, I return to Kalamazoo, anxious
to get back to my thesis.

Now that Christmas is over, I

find it fun to reflect upon my journal entries--in a
sense, relive the experiences.

Tonight I am taking a

short break from my thesis and I begin reading the en
tries, starting with December 23rd .
December 23, 1994
Jackson, Michigan
Well, I am home for Christmas visiting Mom,
Dad, and Scott [my brother]. I must mention the
horrible tragedy that has befallen the Wolf
household! We have always gone together to cut
down our own fresh pine tree for Christmas--it
was perhaps our most treasured family tradi
tion. But this year, when I entered my par
ents' home, I found an artificial tree in the
corner where a beautiful fresh one used to
stand! What blasphemy! What an outrage!
Scott is quite upset also. It seems that there
is a war going on between form and substance,
and the formal revolution looks to be victori
ous!
December 24, 1994
Jackson, Michigan
I tried to explain to Mom and Dad how very
upset Scott and I are about the artificial
tree. I even tried to get into the whole form
v. substance debate, but they obviously did not
understand. I tried to talk Scott into partic
ipating in a counterrevolution with me--I sug
gested we could fast on veggie burgers and
bottled water until Mom and Dad gave in and cut
down a fresh tree. But I guess my brother did
not understand my position either. One sniff
of Mom's home cooking and he retreated to the
enemy's camp. Oh well, I tried!
December 25, 1994--Christmas Day!
Jackson, Michigan
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I guess I will no longer need to eat and study
upon my bed, as my family worked together to
refinish an antique desk of my great grand
mother's to give to me as a gift. I am happy
because the desk ties me to a woman's past;
they are all happy because that desk makes me
appear more professional. There's that issue
of form versus substance again, incessantly
controlling my Christmas holiday!
At any
rate, I am having a good break, though not a
very relaxing one. I keep having horrible
dreams in which Greek choruses (I'm not sure if
they are fraternal or ancient) chant obsceni
ties at me for not bringing work home to do
over Christmas. And almost every night, garish
faces--all twisted and contorted--float dis
embo�ied above my bed, all claiming to be the
mysterious Professor Geezer who sent me the e
mail messages. Believe me, I will be glad to
hop into my old Pontiac and head home to Kala
mazoo .
Laughter overtakes me as I re-read the December 25th
entry.

I remember having those dreams!

But now I am

back to work in Kalamazoo, so hopefully the Greeks--Alpha
Omega or Aristotle--will decide to leave me alone.

I put

down my journal, this time not on my nightstand, but on
my new desk.

My thoughts tonight are still on the issue

of reflexivity.
I think of how Ashmore outlined the possibility of
using reflexivity as a "critical tool" (Ashmore, 1989, p.
xxviii).

In the course of my readings of articles writ

ten as new literary forms, it sometimes occurs to me that
some advocates of new literary forms treat this method as
an end in and of itself.

It seems to me that not only

can reflexivity be utilized as a critical tool, but new
literary forms can also.
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New literary forms should be used as a method--not
as the object of production.

I decide to check Ashmore's

text (1989) for his stance on the use of new literary
forms as method.

I find that Ashmore does prefer to use

new literary forms as a methodological tool.

I am con

Though both he and I believe that new literary

fused.

forms should be used as a method, I find the ways in
which we use new literary forms as method to be very
different.

Again, this definitely ties into the third

Chapter of my thesis--the feminist critique of new liter
ary forms.

The outline of my critique begins to take

concrete form, so I quickly make a note to myself on a
yellow legal pad.
Reading my journal entries from Christmas really
made me reflect on the life I've chosen to lead, as an
academic.
mind.

In particular, one incident stands out in my

When I was at my parents' home visiting for the

Christmas holiday, many of my old high school friends
wanted me to explain my thesis to them.

One of the most

often asked questions concerning new literary forms was
this:

"Why write new literary forms?"

I spouted all of

the usual stuff about more creative freedom and striving
for reflexivity.
answers.

But I was not really satisfied with my

I make a resolution to do some more in-depth

research on this very question.

My starting point is to
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uncover why other writers in sociology are using new
literary forms.

I begin reading and compiling notes at

my desk.
I find that some argue for the aesthetic value of
writing new literary forms.

For example, in keeping with

Ashmore's view, author Roland Barthes (1983) claims that
the very nature of writing makes it a socially
constructed art form:
Because it stages language, instead of simply
using it, literature feeds knowledge into the
machinery of infinite reflexivity. Through
writing, knowledge ceaselessly reflects on
knowledge, in terms of a discourse which is no
longer epistemological, but dramatic. (pp.
463-464)
But what is the essence of the attraction to this
marginal form of writing?

Really what purpose(s) does it

serve other than catering to the whims of writers who are
''obsessed with methodology to the exclusion of all else .
. The dire result is their unreadability and, much
worse, their retention of a naive belief in the possi
bility of writing truer texts" (Ashmore, 1989, p. 60)?
Mulkay (1984), an advocate of reflexivity and user of new
literary forms, gives a very satisfying answer to this
question:
If we accept that our own discourse, as ana
lysts, is a flexible and contingent accomplish
ment, and .
. that our readings of partici
pants' discourse are potentially multiple and
open-ended, then it may be possible, through an
awareness of, and a creative approach to, our

own discourse, to devise ways of accepting,
coping with, even celebrating, reflexivity.
(p.

266)

Besides creating more questions than it answers, the
more informal tone and structure of the work done as new
literary forms also brings the reader into a dialectical
process with the writing.

Many new literary forms ban

the writers' (i.e. the social scientists') claim to a
privileged interpretation of their own work, and seek to
uncover the "multivocal character" of all texts (Woolgar
&

Ashmore, 1988, p. 4), as well as assuming the autono

my/free will/agency of the reader (Woolgar

&

Ashmore,

1988, p. 13).
One of the main reasons I choose to write new liter
ary forms is that I find them very liberating, "a re
lease, however temporary, from the constraints of repre
sentational realism," as Ashmore (1989, p. xxix) so
eloquently puts it.

I think Pinch and Pinch5 (1988) sum

up my position on new literary forms very nicely:
Some authors seem (e.g. Mulkay) to advocate
unconventional writing, not as a means to de
construct work in SSK, but just in the general
sense of providing writers with greater freedom
to make points in different ways. (p. 195)
Is That a Fact?
Speaking of the constraints of realism, there is an
ongoing argument in the new literary forms literature
concerning fact and fiction.

Is it desirable for social
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scientists to write in a fictional manner?

If so, does

fiction undermine the objective, serious tone of tradi
tional natural science writing, which is what social
scientists have sought to emulate?
Many scholars have criticized new literary forms-with such creative titles as "Don Quixote's Double"
(Mulkay 1988), "Welcome to the PARASITE CAFE" (Pfohl
1990), and The Three Little Dinosaurs or a Sociologist's
Nightmare" (Latour 1989)--saying that they are merely
nonserious fictions.

But, as Ashmore contends (1989, p.

66), the "explicitly fictional forms of writing" employed
by writers of new literary forms, imply a "critique of
the distinction between the fictional and the factual."
This leads us into a whole new world, where

11

. facts

and fictions are interpretive creations" (Mulkay, 1985,
p. 11), where "neither .

. has a privileged relation

ship to the world in which we are interested" (Mulkay,
1985, p. 12).

But if one translates fact and fiction

into objective and subjective (respectively), I contend
that the relationship of privilege is laid bare.

I will

explore this issue further in Chapter III.
In defense of new literary forms being explicitly
fictional creations, Mulkay (1985, p. 11) posits that it
is very hard to separate fact from fiction in writing,
and that "there is no necessary, or even close, connec-
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tion between the use of a fictional form, such as imagi
nary dialogue, and the endorsement of false statements
about the world"--one is able to "extract certain facts
from supposedly fictional texts."

I especially like

Rimbaud's phrase, "reflexive fiction," and apply it
appropriately to new literary forms, for it denotes "the
intertextual commingling of the real and the fictional"
(quoted in Ashmore, 1989, p. 51).
As for charging new literary forms with the crime of
nonseriousness, Ashmore happily admits and fully cele
brates the fact that in his new literary forms, he adopts
"an attitude of serious nonseriousness" (1989, p. 27).
He contends that:

"Serious purposes can be addressed

with nonserious means" (1989, p. xxix).

He even goes so

far to say that even though many new literary forms have
the appearance of nonseriousness, they are in fact seri
ous in essence (Ashmore, 1989):
If the quality of nonseriousness is produced,
as I claim, by the textual manipulation of
appearance, then it would seem that the quality
of seriousness must be the result of a similar
process. And this means, in turn, that there
is no intrinsic distinction between the serious
and the nonserious. (p. 59)
Meeting With a Geezer:

January, 1995

The New Year has come and gone and my thesis is
progressing quite nicely.

I decided to do myself a favor
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and invest in my own computer.

I'm moving even closer to

the substantive image of a "real" academic.

I must admit

that I am getting quite fond of sitting at my new desk.
In fact, I placed it (well out of range of the bedroom)
in the livingroom of my apartment, with my new 486DX2/66
computer sitting atop it.

I'm not quite sure what all

of those numbers and slashes mean, but I'm told it is
very impressive.

I am struck by the oddity of seeing a

brand new computer resting on a treasured, old antique.
Perhaps Great Grandma would be offended that I even
placed my computer atop her desk?

At any rate, I can

now work in the comfort of my own home.
Kalamazoo just got hit with another huge snowstorm,
so I wisely decide to remain at home today, working on my
thesis and nursing my aching head, not to mention my
queasy stomach--let's just say I went "out" last night
and drank a little too much vino.

I turn on the computer

and situate myself in the uncomfortable office chair my
father loaned me.

It's really quite funny--the desk is a

beautiful antique belonging originally to a woman, and my
father (an accountant) lends me a very stocky, masculine
office chair to accompany the desk.

I sense another form

v. substance argument coming on.
I haul out my disks, preparing to begin the prologue
to my feminist critique chapter.

The glaring blue screen
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"Ginny, Please

makes my head ache even worse as I read:

meet me in the basement of the Bernhard Center for lunch
this afternoon.
Professor G. 11

I think it is about time we met.
I blink hard a couple of times and rub my

eyes to clear away the last vestiges of fuzziness from
the night before.

Nope, it was still there--another

message from the Professor.
to appear on my screen?

How did he get the message

An eerie sensation creeps over

me and I quickly shut off the monitor.

For some strange

reason I have a fleeting thought of a hijacker on the
Information Superhighway.
pain of a headache.

My mind is racing, despite the

Should I meet with him or not?

I contemplate the situation as I take my morning
shower, which makes my hangover much more bearable.

The

Bernhard basement is really quite a safe place to meet,
as it has a string of fast food restaurants6 that are
frequently populated during the noon hour.

My overwhelm

ing curiosity overrules my slight sense of fear, and I
decide to attend the meeting.

On my way out the door, I

stop suddenly and walk slowly over to my desk.

I reacti

vate the monitor--the screen is blank.
In the car on the way to Bernhard, my palms start
sweating, which is very strange since the temperature is
well below freezing.
myself.

It must be nerves, I think to

I need a mental distraction.

I decide to review
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in my head the section of my thesis I have just complet
ed--the paradoxes and ironies of writing new literary
forms.

I recall what the Ashmore text has to say on this

topic.
New literary forms advocates as well as most SSK
practitioners disagree over what to do about the
paradoxes and ironies that seem to frequently permeate
new literary forms writing.

Ashmore (1989) summarizes

the problem and offers a solution:
The problem lies in the basic assumption of the
programme (i.e. the logical positivist move
ment) that no contradiction can be true and
hence that the reasonings which result in the
paradoxes must be fallacious. But there is an
alternative: accept the adequacy of the rea
soning which leads to paradox and embrace the
category of dialetheia7; some things just are
both true and false. The end. (p. 69)
Just as Ashmore and his followers celebrate reflex
ivity in their new literary forms, they also embrace the
sometimes paradoxical nature of writing and of the social
sciences, claiming very dramatically that:

"Closure is

the enemy, the lover, the seduction, the trap" (Ashmore,
1989, p. 70).

In practice, Ashmore is fond of using the

new literary form device of "two contradictory endings"
to deal with (i.e., celebrate) paradoxes (1989):
I present them both [contradictory endings],
not in the spirit of offering alternatives
(either/or) but rather in the spirit of paradox
(both/and) which only stops those who .
cannot get beyond the binary opposition which
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paradox subverts by denying its very possibili
ty.
(p. 163)
I finish going over paradox and irony and realize
that it has only taken me a couple of minutes to recon
struct this information.

I need something else to occupy

my mind until the meeting, to take·my mind off of Profes
sor Geezer.

I decide to go over a very interesting

section of my thesis--new literary forms critique.

But

before I allow my mind to wander into this new topic, I
pause for a moment and think how sad it is that a vi
brant, young, 23-year-old woman is occupying her free
time thinking about new literary forms critique.
should be out partying, I think to myself.

I

But then the

slight twinges of a still present headache remind me that
I did plenty of that last night.
The roads are very slippery, and as I round a sharp
corner, I almost run over two frolicking little squir
rels, or maybe they were gophers?

I hope this is not an

omen for how the rest of my day is going to go.

I force

my mind to drift into new literary forms critique.
and Pinch (1988, p. 179) , 8

Pinch

write a clever article in

which they use a new literary form as a critical tool to
speak out against the use of new literary forms, claiming
that they are "at best trivial and at worst distracting."
Many skeptics see new literary forms as an expression of
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"self conscious cleverness" and not as viable forms of
"narrative organization" (Woolgar 1988a, p. 32).
I am interrupted in the course of my critique, as I
pull into a designated parking space at school.

I notice

it is almost noon, and realize I must hurry or else I
will be late.

As the frigid Michigan wind chaps my face

and my hands, I realize that I still have one whopping
headache.

I pause for just a moment to extract the

Excedrin from my backpack, and pop two bitter pills into
my mouth before trudging through the snow the rest of the
way to the Bernhard Center.
I realize that I have no idea what this man looks
like.

I am expecting perhaps an older man--he calls

himself Professor--very scholarly looking, with salt and
pepper hair.

But he is dressed casually, in jeans, as

sociologists are apt to do.

I realize that I am stereo

typing, but I guess even sociologists are not immuned to
preconceptions (or misconceptions, however the case may
be).

I unbutton my coat as I enter the double doors

leading down the stairs to the Bernhard basement.

The

smell of burgers and fries overwhelms my nostrils, and I
am sorely tempted to go the fast food route for lunch.
take out my wallet from my bag and proceed to count my
cash to see if I have enough money to buy lunch, when a
cold hand touches mine.

I
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"Excuse me, you're Ginny Wolf, aren't you?"

I look

up into pale blue eyes and a powdery white face, stunned.
In front of me was no middle-aged man with graying hair.
Much to my surprise, the Professor is a woman.

CHAPTER III
LOOKING FOR SISTERS
Discovering Julia:

January, 1995

Her name is Dr. Julia Smith--"Please call me Julia"
-and she is a professor of Women's Studies.

She explains

to me during the course of our luncheon that she is a
computer whiz and she thought it would be fun to send me
secret e-mail messages concerning new literary forms.
She has been studying the topic very casually for a
couple of years and decided that she would help me out
with my thesis by graciously, but secretly, giving me
information she had uncovered.

She also tells me that

she is dedicated to mentoring young women like me.

When

I ask her how she managed to send me the messages on
particular terminals at specific times, she just smiles
and takes a bite of her tuna submarine sandwich (minus
the tuna, as she is a vegetarian).
After only an hour of talking and eating, it seems I
have known Julia my entire life.

She is very intelligent

and witty, and she cares passionately for women's issues,
though I do find her a bit old-fashioned.

I tell her of

my growing interest in doing a feminist critique of new
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literary forms, and she seems very happy about it.

She

has done some research on feminism and new literary
forms, and she suggests a very logical starting point for
me--women, specifically feminists, in science.
I remember reading about the .issue of multivocality
in the new literary forms literature:

"Many voices are

not enough when they are still aggressive male voices"
(Pinch and Pinch, 1988, p. 186) !

In fact, if you refer

to Ashmore's list of the Core Set of Sociologists of
Scientific Knowledge, or CSSSK (Ashmore, 1989, pp. 1619),
Malcolm Ashmore, Barry Barnes, David Bloor,
Harry Collins, Nigel Gilbert, Bill Harvey, Jon
Harwood, Karin Knorr-Cetina, Bruno Latour, Mike
Lynch, Donald MacKenzie, Michael Mulkay, Andy
Pickering, Trevor Pinch, Jonathon Potter, David
Travis, Steve Woolgar, and Steven Yearley,
you will find that the formal SSK/new literary forms
movement is comprised almost entirely of men.

I tell

Julia that I think finding women's voices in science will
be difficult, as I know that most SSK practitioners are
men.

However, I discover via Julia that there are a few

women writers in the area of science studies that may be
of some help--for example, Evelyn Fox Keller, Donna
Haraway, and Sandra Harding.
We end our luncheon and Julia tells me to give her a
call anytime I need any help; she writes her number down
on a piece of napkin left over from our meal.

She claims
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she has to rush back for a Women's Studies organizational
meeting, and runs off towards Wood Hall, overcoat flying
in the wind behind her.

I notice she dropped a book on

the ground, so I bend over to pick it up.

As I prepare

to call to her, I see that she has. virtually disappeared.
I decide to walk over to Wood Hall and leave it in the
Women's Studies Department for her.
"I'm sorry.

There's no professor here by that

name," the Women's Studies secretary tells me.
strange, I think to myself.

That's

I pull out the telephone

number Julia left with me and ask the woman if this is
the number for Women's Studies.
says she doesn't recognize it.
office, taking the book with me.

Shaking her head, she
Confused, I leave the
But not before secretly

checking the faculty mailboxes around the corner to
search for Julia Smith--she was not there.

She never

actually said she worked here at WMU, but I just assumed
she did--especially when she went flying off towards Wood
Hall.

As well as being confused, I also feel a strange

and unexplainable sense of loss, of loneliness, as I
drive home.
That night, I lay awake in bed, still reliving my
meeting with Dr. Smith--Julia--and ponder the fact that I
cannot seem to locate her.

I am excited to begin my

search for feminist critique materials in the morning,
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and feel my heart pumping with anticipation.
going to come very slowly to me tonight.

Sleep is

I decide to

open up my cedar chest and look at old photos to help
pass the time until I feel tired.
I like to call this beautiful piece of furniture my
"hope chest," though I really don't know why.

My mother

used to refer to it as such when I was younger, so I
guess it is just a habit.

My grandmother--my mother's

mother--gave it to me as a gift when I graduated from
high school.

It is made of very fine wood and the top is

covered by a stunning tapestry of many colors.

I would

say that this chest is my most prized possession, not
because of the chest itself, but because of its contents.
All of my most special memories can be found in that
chest--photos, diaries, baby clothes knitted for me by
Mom, old corsages, and special gifts from cherished
friends and relatives.
Tonight I pick up an old photo album that contains
pictures of my mother's ancestors--mostly women.

This

old album was given to me by my grandfather's sister, and
its age shows in the dusty pages, with their worn and
torn edges.

Looking at these pictures really gives me a

sense of nostalgia, of history.

I feel very connected to

these women, though I didn't know any of them.
the next page I come to my great grandmother.

As I flip
I feel
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especially close to her, since I now have her antique
Her name was Julia Smith.

desk.

JULIA SMITH!

The name stared at me--big black letters scrawled
underneath her picture.
album shut.

I gulped hard and slammed the

Remembering the book Julia dropped this

afternoon, I run to inspect its contents.

It is a diary

-a diary written by Julia Miller Smith, dating back
almost 100 years.

I did not meet with a WMU Women's

Studies professor for lunch--! met with the ghost of my
great grandmother! 9
Sisters of Science Found:

February, 1995

It takes me most of the night and a good portion of
the following two weeks to get over the shock of discov
ering I actually had an encounter with a metaphysical
being.

Perhaps she goes wherever her desk goes; perhaps

I just imagined her.

But if she is not real, how could I

possibly have her diary?

At any rate, I have decided

that Julia's "appearance" (whether form or substance) has
special meaning for my work.

Great grandmother Julia has

sent me on a journey--a journey to find my epistemolog
ical sisters.

She wants me to turn to contemporary

history, to my feminist predecessors for help.
The next day, I decide to hit the books at the
library again, this time with a specific direction in
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mind.

As I walk past some computer terminals on the way

to my favorite table on the second floor, I glance at the
screens, half expecting another message from Great Grand
mother Julia.

I suppose I could just call her Julia-

after all, that is what she told me to call her at lunch.
That is, if she was really there.

At any rate, I feel

this childlike need to show her resp�ct, now that I have
discovered she is my great grandma.

I wouldn't even walk

up to my own mother and call her Nancy!

But I vow to try

and call Great Grandma by her given name; it seems she
wants it this way.
I do as Julia suggested and begin with the women in
science.

Actually, my starting point has been right

under my nose for months--I just haven't noticed.

Evelyn

Fox Keller is an historian and a philosopher of science
within the field of science and technology studies (S&TS
) .10

She has an article in the same handbook (Jasanoff et

al., 1995) as the article containing the nameless woman
(Ashmore et al., 1995), so I had to lug that huge book
all the way to the library (again!) so I could make a
copy.
Unlike the article written by the men (Ashmore et
al., 1995), Keller's article appeals to my feminist side.
I am surprised I haven't noticed it before.

Keller

disaggregates "gender and science" into "its component
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parts" (1995, p. 86) and calls for a study of "gender in
science" (p. 86).

She suggests a "new taxonomy" for the

sciences (1995, p. 86)--the study of "the uses of gender
in scientific constructions of subjects and objects that
lie both beneath and beyond the human skin (or skeleton)"
(1995, p. 86).

She brings up some very important issues

that I want to explore in my critique of new literary
forms.

For example, Keller points to the connection

between patriarchy and the dominance of positivistic
science (1995)
For some, a suspicion that 'objectivity' might
be a code for 'domination' went hand in hand
with the fantasy that we had hold of a lever
with which we could not only liberate women but
also turn our disciplines upside down--perhaps,
even change the world.
(p. 83)
I definitely want to explore issues of objectivity,
subjectivity and privilege in the third chapter of my
thesis.
I turn next to Donna Haraway, hominid biologist
turned historian of science.

I find her text, Simians.

cyborgs. and women (1991) to be absolutely fascinating
reading.

She is a very creative writer, albeit a bit

strange at times.

For example, on a single page of her

text (p. 189), she speaks of the "god-trick," "techno
monsters," and "eye fucks"--her language conjures vivid
images in relation to patriarchy and men's conceptions of
science.

Like Keller, she also brings up issues of
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feminist objectivity, writing that we have been "trapped
by two poles of a tempting dichotomy on the question of
objectivity" (1991, p. 183).

On the one hand, there is

the argument of the social constructionist, in which "no
insider's perspective is privileged, because all drawings
of inside-outside boundaries in knowledge are theorized
as power moves, not moves towards truth" (p. 184).

This

social constructionist view is what David Bloor calls his
"strong programme" (1976), which was discussed above.
However, Haraway indicates that some, herself included,
wanted to go beyond "showing bias in science" (p. 186)
and held out for a "feminist version of objectivity" (p.
186), which "requires a knowledge tuned to resonance, not
to dichotomy" (p. 194).
After skimming just a couple of chapters in Hara
way's text, I know that she will prove to be a vital link
in my feminist critique of new literary forms.

I mark

the passages that I find to be relevant to the third
chapter of my thesis--mostly ones dealing with privilege,
objectivity and epistemology.

I decide to move on to

Sandra Harding.
The most interesting and relevant discussion I
decide to explore with Harding (1991) is what she refers
to as "feminist standpoint epistemology" (p. 119).
take many aspects of her reading of this theory and

I can
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readily apply it to my own critique of new literary
forms.

This approach is rooted in the philosophies of

Hegel, Marx, Engels, and Lukacs (p. 120).

Feminist

standpoint theory focuses on "gender differences, on
differences between women's and men's situations which
give a scientific advantage to those who can make use of
the differences" (p. 120).

Standpoint epistemology also

recognizes difference for what it is:

"difference is

only difference, not a sign of inferiority" (p. 122).

To

create a feminist objectivity, Harding claims that we
must include women's life experiences as the bases for
scientific epistemologies, and we must overcome our
"excessive reliance on distinctively masculine lives" (p.
123)
This fits in well with the argument I am trying to
make concerning the men writing new literary forms.
These male writers use their privileged position within
the academy and within patriarchy to perpetuate modes of
knowledge and methods of writing "objectively" that do
not include nor speak to women's epistemologies.
Reflexivity in the Feminine
The next book (Linden, 1993) comes to me from my
advisor, who has just written a book dealing with the
Holocaust (Markle, 1995). 11

I mentioned Linden's book
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before because of its focus on autobiography .
work is incredibly personal and reflexive.

Linden's

She writes:

"My self-reflections became an integral component of my
research, inseparable from the book about Holocaust
survivors I had initially planned to
write" (Linden,
.
1993, p. 2).

She calls her writing "experimental," and

she explicitly calls her book "reflexive" (Linden, 1993,
p. 10).

Markle's book is also reflexive, but in a dif

ferent way. 12
Ashmore seems to advocate Woolgar's (1988a) defini
tion of reflexivity, which Woolgar defines as "the
willingness to probe beyond the level of straight
htforward interpretation" (p. 14).

But is this

definition really helpful for a feminist?

I think not.

What is more helpful is Ashmore's (1989) division of
reflexivity into three different types:

(1) reflexivity

as ''self-reference," (2) reflexivity as "self-awareness,"
and (3) reflexivity as "the constitutive circularity of
accounts" (p. 32).

The third variant of reflexivity

refers to "a general and universal feature of accounting
procedures," and is a technical term employed in
ethnomethodology (Ashmore, 1989, p. 32).

Because of its

narrow application, I would like to leave reflexivity as
the constitutive circularity of accounts, and focus on
the other two variants.
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Linden's writing is an example of reflexivity as
self-referential--she uses the Holocaust to understand
herself.

Self-referential refers to the ability to

critically examine yourself.

My thesis is also an exam

ple of reflexivity as self-referential.

For feminist

writers, reflexivity is synonymous with self-referential.
Ashmore (1989) points out that this self-referential
aspect of reflexivity has been very controversial and is
often latent (p. 32).
On the other hand, Markle is also being reflexive-
as are the new literary forms men--but in a very dif
ferent way.

Markle and the new literary forms men use

reflexivity as self-awareness, for introspection.

Mar

kle's use of reflexivity in his writing (1995) is an
attempt to use himself to understand the Holocaust.
Ashmore points out (1989) that reflexivity as self-aware
ness, unlike women's use of reflexivity, is "rarely
problematic" (p. 32).

The distinction between differ-

ent varieties of reflexivity has helped me understand why
I am feeling uncomfortable with Ashmore et al.'s (1995)
use of the nameless woman.

Their claim to reflexivity is

indeed not of the self-referential variety.

How can

their woman be self-referential when she is not a real
character, but a purposely "gendered" fiction (Ashmore et
al., 1995, p. 323)?
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Mary Jacobus (1982), professor of English and Wo
men's Studies at Cornell University, uses the language of
the well-known French feminist Luce Irigaray to point out
that "masculine systems of representation are those whose
self-reflexiveness and specularity 13 disappropriate women
of their relation to themselves and to other women" (p.
3 8)

I am feeling very sleepy and decide to lay my head
down on the table for a few moments.

I drift in and out

of consciousness, feeling slight breezes of air hit me as
people gently walk by.

I hear low voices, whispering in

the book stacks, unintelligible and far away.

I don't

know how much time has passed, but suddenly I hear a very
distinct, woman's voice:
Julia.

"Ginny.

. Ginny, it's me,

Come to the Women's Studies department as soon as
. I have a surprise for you!"

possible .

Close Encounter of the Sisterly Kind
The frigid February air wakes me up as I trudge over
to Wood Hall.

I thought we were supposed to have an

early spring this year?
is going blind.

Or perhaps our beloved groundhog

As I approach the double doors leading

into Wood Hall, I find I am a bit apprehensive and even a
little scared to enter.

I am not a big believer in the

supernatural--at least I wasn't before Julia appeared.
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Or perhaps I should say re-appeared.

I take a deep

breath and swing the doors open wide.
The hallway is dark and dead; nobody seems to be
around.

Julia didn't specify where I was to go, so I

begin wandering towards the Women's Center office on the
first floor.

It is located at the end of the hallway.

As I approach the office door, I see that it is ajar; a
dim light shines out into the hallway, creating a trian
gle of yellow light on the dirty tile floor.

I consider

running back to the library, but instead decide to take a
chance.

After all, I am a brave and daring young woman.

I take another deep breath and enter the office.
The light is coming from a small conference room
directly across from the office door; I decide to check
in there first.

Much to my surprise, two women sit very

quietly in the room; Julia is on an old red couch and I
don't recognize the other woman.
"Please come in, Ginny" says Great Grandma Julia.
"There's someone I want you to meet."

I walk further

into the room and look closely at the other woman, who
sits very stiff and straight in her chair, with her hands
draped haphazardly about her crossed legs.
duces her to me:

Julia intro-

"Ginny, I'd like you to meet Virginia

Woolf, your namesake."
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I must have passed out, because when I open my eyes,
I am lying on the red couch with Julia and Virginia
bending over me.

I remembered having a dream about

Virginia Woolf; she gave me advice on the Information
Superhighway, and provided the impetus for the outline of
my thesis.

I am very pleased to meet her and speak with

her in person.

I am slowly getting accustomed to the

fact that I am spending too much time lately with ghosts.
Soon I am feeling better and they proceed to tell
me that they like to travel around to various colleges
and universities, checking out the Women's Studies de
partments and wandering through the libraries.

Virginia

tells me she is fond of going to the computerized finder
systems and calling up her own name on the screen.

They

tell me that an education, let alone at the graduate
level, was very difficult for women of their times to
obtain.

So, they vowed that when they died, they would

spend eternity mentoring young women.
Enlightening Epistemologies
Virginia didn't talk much.

Every once in a while

during the course of our conversation, she interjects
with wise, little sayings.
ites is:

For example, one of my favor-

"Science, it would seem, is not sexless; she is

a man, a father, and infected too" (Woolf, 1938, p. 139).
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She seems fond of issues of feminist epistemology, espe
cially in relation to science.
She is also familiar with R. Ruth Linden and tells
us how she speaks of "how knowledge is constructed and
represented in the human sciences" (Linden, 1993, p. 2)
The traditional mode of practicing ethnography, which is
both informed by patriarchy and positivism, serves to
"obscure both subjectivity and agency''
2).

(Linden, 1993, p.

It also ''blur[s] the fact that meanings, by their

very nature, are indeterminate, situated, and emergent"
(Linden, 1993, p. 2).

I am getting a feeling that

feminist epistemologies are very different from those
practiced by the new literary forms men.

I decide that

this conversation can greatly inform my thesis, so I
begin to take copious notes.
Julia takes over speaking about the historical
traditions of epistemology.

She quotes feminist epistem

ologists, Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter (1993):

"[A]

conservative approach that preserves traditional assump
tions and strategies is not a virtue in feminist work"
(p. 2).

I ask Julia to slow down her speech so I can get

some quotes for my thesis (Alcoff

&

Potter, 1993):

The history of feminist epistemology itself is
the history of the clash between the feminist
commitment to the struggles of women to have
their understandings of the world legitimated
and the commitment of traditional philosophy to
various accounts of knowledge--positivist,

57
postpositivist, and others--that have consis
tently undermined women's claims to know.
(p.
2)

I see that the epistemological assumptions used by
male scientists take on a very strong positivistic edge.
Alcoff and Potter (1993, p. 4) claim that the "current
paradigm of knowledge is taken to be the observation of
everyday simple objects, such as sticks, apples, and
patches of color."

This dominant paradigm, which is

definitively masculine, takes epistemology to be univer
sal, denying and negating the need to take subjectivity
into account (Alcoff

&

Potter, 1993, p. 4).

Of course,

the claim to universality does not sit well in feminist
epistemological circles (Alcoff

&

Potter, 1993):

Feminist analyses in philosophy, as in other
disciplines, have insisted on the significance
and particularity of the context of theory.
This has led many feminist epistemologists to
skepticism about the possibility of a general
or universal account of the nature and limits
of knowledge, an account that ignores the so
cial context and status of knowers. (p. 1)
Alcoff and Potter also contend that " [p]art of the reason
why the masculinity of knowledge remains hidden is be
cause it lacks a contrast that would force its sexuality
into relief" (1993, p. 10).
Julia takes a detour and begins arguing with Virgin
ia about postmodernism.

I find postmodernism to be

thoroughly frustrating, confusing, and intriguing.
Several of the statements made by the new literary forms
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writers were implicitly postmodern, and many of the
feminist theorists I use in my critique take postmodern
positions.

So, I know that the postmodern issue is an

important one for my thesis.

But because I consider

postmodernism to be a black hole, I prefer to leave it
alone.
I let Julia and Virginia banter for a few minutes
more, and then decide to intervene.

I saw Virginia's

face begin to redden when Julia advocated the postmodern
ist claim that "there is no subject or agent of knowl
edge" (Alcoff

&

Potter, 1993, p. 8).

I tell them that,

though I am very interested in learning about postmodern
perspectives, I really want to concentrate on my new
literary forms critique at the moment.

I suggest we move

into issues of objectivity, since that seems to be a
critical concept to both feminist epistemology and that
of the men I seek to critique.
Subjectively, I Object to Male Objectivity!
From Julia, I learned that " [i]t may be, for in
stance, that it was feminist scholars who initially
raised the question of cultural constructions of object
ivity as a central issue for investigation" (Keller,
1995, p. 91).

I tell Virginia and Julia that I have pur

chased a two volume set of journals, filled with articles
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dealing specifically with objectivity (Annals of
Scholarship. 8:3-4, 1991; 9:1-2, 1992)

Both issues are

at my apartment, so I invite Julia and Virginia to
accompany me home.

They agree, and I feel a rush of

anticipation at the thought of showing these women where
I live.

However, since they are ghosts, they probably
The thought sends tiny

have already seen my place.
shivers down my spine.

Both women are very quiet as I drive them to my
apartment.

In fact, as we enter my building and board

the elevator, I am grateful for the company of Jane
Innis, my neighbor who is already inside waiting to
ascend to the forth floor.

She is an avid talker, so I

think of introducing her to Virginia and Julia.

But as I

turn around to gesture towards my two visitors, they are
nowhere to be found.

Apparently they don't like to

interact with just any human.
Once inside my apartment, they reappear and we get
to work discussing objectivity.

I open up my thesis file

on the computer and show them what I have written on the
topic so far.

Out of the corner of my eye, I notice a

tear run down Great Grandma Julia's face, as she recog
nizes her old desk.

Though I looked at every article

contained in the two volumes, I only found two in partic
ular that related to my research (Hawkesworth, 1991;
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Megill, 1991).

I sit down at the desk and slowly scroll

down the screen, as Julia and Virginia begin to read .
As editor of both volumes of the journal, I find
Allan Megill's comprehensive discussion of the "four
principal senses" of objectivity to be very helpful to my
feminist critique (1991, p. 301).

The papers that com

prise both volumes of the journal cover more extensively
these four types of objectivity, known as:
(2) disciplinary,

(1) absolute,

(3) dialectical, and (4) procedural (p.

301)
The first type of objectivity is called a "philo
sophical or absolute sense" (Megill, 1991, p. 301).

This

perspective seeks to represent "'things as they really
are'" (p. 302).

The disciplinary sense of objectivity is

closely tied to the absolute sense.

Megill defines the

disciplinary sense institutionally, as "the claim by
practitioners of a particular discipline

. to have

authoritative jurisdiction over its area of competence"
(p. 305).

Both absolute and disciplinary objectivity

have a "negative relation to subjectivity.

Absolute

objectivity seeks to exclude subjectivity; disciplinary
objectivity seeks to contain it" (p. 307).

Dialectical

objectivity, which involves "an interaction between
researcher and object" (p. 306), takes a different
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position.

Megill describes dialectical objectivity as

involving
a positive attitude toward subjectivity. The
defining feature of dialectical objectivity is
the claim that subjectivity is indispensable to
the constituting of objects. Associated with
this feature is a preference for "doing" over
"viewing." (p. 308)
And finally, the procedural sense of objectivity can be
seen as a "modification of absolute objectivity" (p.
310)

Procedural objectivity
focuses solely on impersonality of procedure,
abstracting from the hoped-for aim of truth;
thus it widens the gap between "truth" and
"objectivity" that is already present in the
discussion of absolute objectivity.
(p. 310)
In my critique of new literary forms, I specifically

employ the definitions of the absolute and the dialecti
cal senses of objectivity.

I would like to construct a

polemic between the men writing new literary forms and
feminist writers such as myself, to help in understanding
the differential ways in which each gender conceptualizes
the objective/subjective argument.

It is my contention

that Ashmore and his fellow new literary forms writers-
in the process of seeking to sustain an "authentic re
flexive practice" (Ashmore, 1989, p. 83)--have not broken
free of an absolute sense of objectivity.
For example, Ashmore et al. (1995) still put dis
tance between themselves as researchers and the subject
they are studying--the nameless woman.

In fact, the

62

woman becomes object.

Evelyn Fox Keller supports my

argument in her discussion of science as masculine:
"Masculine here connotes, as it so often does, autonomy,
separation, and distance.

It connotes a radical rejec

tion of any commingling of subject and object" (1978, p.
415)
Feminist writers, on the other hand, employ objec
tivity in the dialectical sense.

We seek to enter into a

relationship with those that we study.

I'll use myself

as an example, after all, I am not only a feminist writ
er, but I also utilize new literary forms.

I do not seek

to be what is absolutely defined as objective.

I create

virtually no distance between myself as researcher and
the subject of my narrative, who is also myself.
experiences are my experiences.

Ginny's

I have intimate knowl

edge of my subject, whereas Ashmore et al. (1995), as
males, do not.

Political theorist Mary Hawkesworth

(1991) supports my argument that the new literary forms
written by men create distance between subject and ob
ject, with a statement she takes from Thomas Nagel:
"Claims of detachment, disinterest, distance, and univer
sality merely serve as mechanisms for male hegemony,
substituting certain men's perspectives for an impossible
view from nowhere" (p. 454).
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Hawkesworth (1991), provides a very helpful overview
of recent feminist critiques of objectivity.

She also

gets into the relationship between objectivity and privi
lege.

Though the male new literary forms writers claim

to ban researcher privilege, I contend that the manner in
which these men construct objectivity does not allow them
to do this successfully.
Hawkesworth opens her paper with a question:
should the feminist stance toward objectivity be:
mation or rejection" (1991, p. 451)?

"What
recla

Hawkesworth, to use

the above categories of Megill, speaks exclusively here
about the absolute sense of objectivity.

She contends

that feminists have critiqued objectivity because of a
broken promise, a promise that objectivity would "free us
from distortion, bias, and error in intellectual inquiry
and from arbitrariness, self-interest, and caprice in
ethical, legal, and administrative decisions" (1991, p.
452).

Hawkesworth points to the historically ''erroneous

claims" and pervasive "mistakes" concerning the nature of
women as evidence of this broken promise (p. 452).

She

also contends that feminists have explored the notion
that investigations of both the natural and the social
world are "value-permeated rather than value-neutral" (p.
453).
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In keeping with Hawkesworth's perspective, Haraway
(1991) writes that the feminist problem of constructing
objectivity
is how to have simultaneously an account of
radical historical contingency for all knowl
edge claims and knowing subjects, a critical
practice for recognizing our own 'semiotic
technologies' for making meanings, and a no
nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a
'real' world, one that can be partially shared
and friendly to earth-wide projects of finite
freedom, adequate material abundance, modest
meaning in suffering, and limited happiness.
(p. 187)
In other words, Haraway believes that feminist objectivi
ty simply means situated knowledges (1991, p. 188).
The term situated knowledges encompasses many defi
nitions.

It includes consideration of the "particularity

and embodiment of all vision" (Haraway, 1991, p. 189),
and a "feminist writing of the body" that emphasizes
vision (p. 189).

Haraway writes that only the feminist

notions of partial perspectives and situated knowledges
hold out the promise of a truly objective vision (p.
190).

While a non-feminist objectivity is about the

"splitting of subject and object" (p. 190), feminist
objectivity "is about limited location and situated
knowledge" (p. 190).
The splitting of subject and object is exactly the
point I want to make about men writing new literary
forms.

While feminist writers seek to unite subject and
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object, or at least explore the relationship between the
two, a non-feminist construction of subject and object,
as embodied by the male new literary forms writers,
splinters this relationship.

Ashmore et al.'s (1995)

article with the nameless woman is an excellent example
of this point.
Discussions of objectivity again bring us to the
issue of privilege.

The distance and disinterest re

quired to practice the male notion of absolute objectivi
ty, implicitly imply that the researcher's position is
privileged over that of his subject(s).

Feminist schol

ars who have contended that "objectivity lies beyond
reclamation" (Hawkesworth, 1991, p. 454), have formulated
alternative conceptions of objectivity that deny the re
searchers any claims to privileged status.

For example,

a reformulation of what we may call a feminist notion of
objectivity,

would include a "capacity of critical

reflection," as well as a healthy dose of intersubject
ivity (Hawkesworth, 1991, p. 468).

Feminist objectivity

would demand inclusivity--specifically, the inclusion of
women and people of color (Hawkesworth, 1991, p. 468)
Finally, a feminist notion of objectivity "cannot be
attained within the preserves of privilege" (Hawkesworth,
1991, p. 468).
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Interrupting her reading, Julia tells us that in her
opinion, privilege is intimately tied to constructions of
men's Truth, as opposed to women's truths.

For example,

Haraway entitles chapter nine of her book (1991), "Situ
ated knowledges:

The science question in feminism and

the privilege of partial perspectives," indicating that
from a feminist perspective, there is no Truth with a
capital "T."

Also, Alcoff and Potter (1993), in the

title of their work, use the plural "epistemologies,"
claiming that there is no "single referent" for the term
epistemology (p. 1).

Julia also refers to Linden (1993)

on the issue of privilege:
or absolute.

"· ..truth is rarely singular

There are only truths:

relative, changing,

emergent--as new light is shed on familiar circumstances.
And silences, too, are a matter of degree." (p. ix).
Notice that Linden uses a lower case "t" for truths, as
well as the plural form of the word, indicating there is
no universal.
Subjectivity Revived
We decide to take a break for lunch, so I make us a
vegetarian stir fry.

I ask Virginia and Julia why they

have to be vegetarian if they are ghosts?

Much to my

disappointment, they tell me that women have to watch
there appearance even in the nether regions.
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After lunch, I bring up the work of French feminist
Luce Irigaray, whom I have been reading lately, and ask
for Virginia's and Julia's opinions on her work.

I tell

them that perhaps her writing does not speak explicitly
to the context of the subjectivity/objectivity argument
concerning new literary forms.

But I believe some of her

insights can be readily incorporated into my feminist
critique.

I give them some background on Irigaray in

case they are not familiar with her work.
Rosi Braidotti, Professor of Women's Studies at the
University of Utrecht, claims that Irigaray's work seeks
to redesign the way we conceptualize subjects.

Irigaray

seeks to discover a "language and a form of representa
tion that adequately renders women's experience" (Braid
otti, 1994, p. 111).

Irigaray is an essentialist (Schor,

1994, p. 59); she brings women's bodies into sharp focus,
and even "sexualizes in the feminine the very structures
of subjectivity" (Braidotti, 1994, p. 111).

Braidotti

(1994) eloquently and powerfully explains Irigaray's
perspective:
An elemental sort of female cosmology pervades
Irigaray's work: a firm, even shocking deter
mination to return to the female imaginary the
colors, the shapes, and the tempo of woman's
passions, her thoughts, her perceptions, and
the specific patterns of interaction that mark
her as sexed female. (pp. 111-112)
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Braidotti explains that Irigaray posits a redefini
tion of female subjectivity--how do we "make the feminine
express a different difference, a pure difference,'' that
breaks out of the trap of binary thinking that is a
trademark of the Western world (Braidotti, 1994, p. 112)
Metatheorist and feminist, Kathy Ferguson, posits
that maleness has been equated with humanness (Ferguson,
1993, p. 38).

Male subjectivity ''constitutes the self as

bounded agent in the world, the center of all things,
active, reflective, coinciding neatly
(Ferguson, 1993, p. 38).

. with itself"

It seems to me that Ferguson

has a lot to say concerning the issue of the nameless
woman.

Perhaps I am obsessed with thoughts of this

nameless, bodyless woman, but I believe she is central to
my critique.

Ashmore et al. (1995) believed they were

creating an active subject in the form of the nameless
woman.

But in the context of their writing, she was con

fined to a male notion of subjectivity (Ferguson, 1993)
Women in male humanist [subjective] discourse
have generally been among those others, con
signed to the world of the acted-upon, of oth
erness colonized in the service of maintaining
the sameness of the subject. All male-ordered
constructions of subjectivity do not necessari
ly figure women in the same terms.
(p. 38)
Before continuing, I tell Julia and Virginia that I
want to make sure we explore essentialism and its place
in the feminist movement, as well as its contribution to
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my critique of new literary forms, though it is very
controversial.

Ferguson (1993) claims that feminists

have long struggled "between efforts to redefine the
gendered subject by centering it in women's experiences
and efforts to deconstruct the gendered subject
altogether" (p. 15).

Both women look a bit nervous at

the prospect of discussing essentialism, so I decide to
offer them drinks and some dessert to lighten the mood.
The Essentials of Essentialism
As I have already mentioned, from my own experience
and the tone of my readings on essentialism, I know that
this controversial philosophy has caused and is causing
great conflict within the feminist movement.

Julia and

Virginia wholeheartedly agree, and I can see that Virgin
ia is beginning to loosen up a bit.

Plus, she had at

least three glasses of wine so far.
I think we need to begin our discussion with a
definition of essentialism, just so we all understand
what we are talking about.

So, I tell them about Namoi

Schor's--a Professor of Romance Studies and Comparative
Literature at Duke University--definition of essential
ism, which she takes from the Dictionary of philosophy
and religion (Schor, 1994):
essentialism is the belief that things have
Essentialism in the specific
essences.
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context of feminism consists in the belief that
woman has an essence, that woman can be speci
fied by one or a number of inborn attributes
that define across cultures and throughout
history her unchanging being and in the absence
of which she ceases to be categorized as a
woman.
(p. 5 9 )
Schor goes on to further explain that the female body
remains "the rock of feminism" to the essentialist (1994,
p. 60).

Elaine Showalter, a Professor of English at

Princeton, agrees with Schor, claiming that essentialist
or biologically-based feminism "generally stresses the
importance of the body as a source of imagery" (Showal
ter, 1982, p. 18).

For example, metaphors of pregnancy,

gestation, and birth are widely used.
Personally, I believe that the essentialist position
is potentially dangerous, especially within the context
of our patriarchal system.

Agreeing with me, Julia says,

"Simply to invoke anatomy risks a return to the crude
essentialism, the phallic and ovarian theories of art,
that oppressed women in the past" (Showalter, 1982, p.
17).

Virginia agrees, and asks me why I am including an

essentialist argument in my thesis?
That is a good question, and one I have been ponder
ing a lot lately.

Though I do consider the biological

determinism of an essentialist position to be potentially
dangerous, I do struggle with the notion of completely
disregarding the body, as I believe mainstream feminism
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Perhaps by taking some aspects from the essential

ist camp and coupling them with standpoint theory (for
example) would help to enrich feminist epistemologies and
philosophies.

Women do have bodies as well as minds, and

it seems to me that we should pay attention to both
dimensions.

Plus, I tell them, there are some revolu

tionary aspects of essentialist thought that greatly
appeal to me.

Sometimes it seems that mainstream Ameri

can or cultural approaches to feminism are operating too
much within the system and maintaining a reformist atti
tude.
I have already taken from Harding's discussion of
feminist standpoint theory, which does not suggest "that
the biological differences between women and men provide
the resources for feminist analysis" (Harding, 1991, p.
133).

In other words, feminist standpoint theory is

explicitly anti-essentialist.

But at a time when the

feminist movement is characterized by fragmentation, I
think perhaps a consideration of essentialist feminist
arguments will provide my critique with a richer frame
work within which to operate.
Julia asks if we can leave the essentialist camp for
the moment and discuss explicitly women's writing and how
it differs from men's.

I am very eager to speak on this

topic, as it is integral to my thesis critique of new
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literary forms.

I poise on the edge of my seat, notebook

in lap and pen in hand.

Virginia begins by using her own

life as an example.
On Women's Writing
.

She tells us how most professions were historically
closed to women, except for that of writing (Woolf, 1938,
p. 140).

And, still a bit angry towards the tenets of

essentialism, Virginia haughtily adds, "And moreover,
whatever the brain might do when the professions were
opened to it, the body remained" (1938, p. 140).

Virgin

ia then says that though she is definitely anti-essen
tialist, she will admit that "A woman's writing is always
feminine; it cannot help being feminine; at its best it
is most feminine; the only difficulty lies in defining
what we mean by feminine" (quoted in Showalter, 1982, p.
14).
But what is meant by "feminine" writing?

Julia

contends that we can go in a few different directions
with this question.

Linguistic and textual theories of

women's writing, according to Showalter (1982), would ask
whether men and women use language differently;
whether sex differences in language use can be
theorized in terms of biology, socialization,
or culture; whether women can create new lan
guages of their own; and whether speaking,
reading, and writing are all gender marked.
(p. 20)

Judith Kegan Gardiner, Professor of English at the
University of Illinois, identifies two main feminist
positions that explore women's writing.

The most common

answer as to why women's writing is different, she says,
is because "women's experiences differ from men's in
profound and regular ways" (Gardiner, 1982, p. 178).
This is evident in the differential imagery employed by
women writers (p. 178).

Virginia points out that this

experiential difference is manifested very clearly in my
thesis writing, as opposed to the writing of the new
literary forms men.
The other main explanation, she contends, "posits a
female consciousness that produces styles and structures
innately different from those of the masculine mind"
(Gardiner, 1982, p. 178).

It seems to me that this

second argument is somewhat essentialist in nature.
Plus, this argument is not readily visible when one
compares my thesis with the new literary forms written by
men.
I tell Julia and Virginia that I am partial to her
former argument that takes women's differential experi
ences into account.

In fact, this, I argue, is one of

the primary reasons why my version of a new literary form
is different from those created by men.

And differential

experience is also why Ashmore et al.'s (1995) use of the
nameless woman does not work--her experiences are not
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those of a real woman.

Her experiences are created and

stereotyped by three male writers!

Women's writing tends

to be "fluid," less linear and more circular (Gardiner,
1982, p. 185), and it also tends to reflect the disso
nance felt between "women's experiences of identity and
men's paradigms for the human experience" (p. 184).
Now I am excited and writing furiously.

Julia and

Virginia have given me a wealth of information to put
There's only one more thing I want to

into my critique.

explore, with their help--feminist alternatives to mascu
line constructions of objectivity, subjectivity, and
epistemology.

I feel that my critique of the male writ

ers would be much stronger if I offered feminist alterna
tives for practice.
An Alternative Recipe
We have moved away from my computer and are now
sitting comfortably on my livingroom floor.

I do have

one couch in my apartment, but Virginia and Julia chose
to sit on the floor.

I think the quantities of wine they

are consuming have a lot to do with it.

The conversation

at this point is very animated and very loud.
Virginia offers a humorous segue into my discussion
of feminist alternatives.

She claims that the story

comes from Ferguson (1993), whom we have already dis-
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cussed.

She gives a short history of patriarchy and

claims that in the late Middle Ages, men asked the question:

"Are women human" (p. 36)?

At this point, Virgin-

ia is struggling to hold in her laughter.

Apparently,

Julia is also familiar with this quote, because she too
can barely keep a straight face.

Virginia continues,

saying that Ferguson contends that in reference to con
temporary questions of subjectivity, feminists may legitimately ask:

"Are men human" (Ferguson, 1993, p. 36)?

Julia and Virginia begin laughing uncontrollably.

Being

infected by the humorous contagion, I also begin to
laugh.

When we finally gain control of ourselves, Julia

goes on, in a serious tone, to expand upon Ferguson's
second question (1993):
A better way to engage the man question with
regard to subjectivity might be to ask, What
kinds of subjectivity, what vision of what it
means to be a person, characterize the patriar
chal world? What have men made out of person
hood? (p. 3 7 )
And as we discussed earlier, men have equated maleness
with humanness--women have historically been excluded
from personhood.
Julia and Virginia want me to understand why we
clearly need an alternative feminist perspective, in
general and also in new literary forms, and not just a
revision of the existing framework (Showalter, 1982):
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So long as we look to androcentric models for our
most basic principles, even if we revise them by
adding the feminist frame of reference, we are
learning nothing new. And when the process is so
one-sided, when male critics boast of their
ignorance
of
feminist
criticism,
it
is
disheartening to find feminist critics still
anxious for approval from the "white fathers" who
will not listen or reply.
(p. 13)
I wholeheartedly agree with this sentiment.

They also

say that it is crucial to understand that "feminism is,
first

and

last,

a

political

practical issues" (Alcoff
me

I

need

to

&

"recognize

movement

concerned

Potter, 1993, p. 2).
that

values,

1993, p. 3).

They tell

politics,

knowledge are intrinsically connected" (Alcoff

with

&

and

Potter,

I .thank them for helping me understand these

points, as I believe they will help inform my thesis and my
own life.
Julia takes a brief but informative aside, and tells
me that some of her friends do not seek to place gender as
the "primary axis of oppression" (Alcoff

&

Potter, 1993, p.

3), as I seem to do:
We find a strong consensus among feminists today
that both the term and the project of feminism
itself must be more inclusive than a focus on
gender alone permits. If feminism is to liberate
women, it must address virtually all forms of
domination because women fill the ranks of every
category of oppressed people.
(p. 4)
Julia asks me what I think of this position.

I tell her

that I agree with being more inclusive in relation to
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racial, age, ethnic and class issues.

But I do not agree

with replacing gender as the primary axis of oppression.
It seems to me that perhaps Alcoff and Potter have it
backwards--if women are contained in all ranks of op
pressed people, and all oppressed people are not con
tained in the ranks of women, it seems to me that the
category of gender must be primary.

Virginia agrees with

me, as does Julia.
I ask them what, in general, is the feminist answer

..
to a plausible
alternative to male writing?

Julia,

again, refers me to Ferguson (1993, p. 12), who writes,
"Most feminist arguments for a women's perspective,
voice, or standpoint call upon some version of an ontolo
gy of discovery and an epistemology of attunement."

She

then goes on to identify two very popular feminist per
spectives--the interpretive approach, and the genealog
ical approach.
Ferguson defines the interpretive approach as a
perspective that believes there is some inherent order in
the world that "can be discovered or at least approached
by human knowing" (Ferguson, 1993, p. 10).

On the other

hand, as we can see in the work of Luce Irigaray, for
example, "much of contemporary French feminist theory is
heavily influenced by the genealogical project" (Fer
guson, 1993, p. 12).

This is defined as a "counter-
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ontology" that "denies there is any order out there to be
discovered" (Ferguson, 1993, p. 10).

I can see that

postmodernism is beginning to creep into our discussion
again.
Some would say that this opposition between the
interpretive and the genealogical approaches undermines
the realization of a feminist alternative in practice,
much as some see the contemporary fragmentation of soci
ology as a disciplinary weakness.

However, sister Sandra

Harding, for one, welcomes this tension between ontology
and counter-ontology--she "embraces the partiality and
open-endedness that accompany an anti-totalizing project"
(Ferguson, 1993, p. 12).

Harding claims that it is no

surprise that feminist epistemologies are somewhat
unstable at this point in history--"we will have a
feminist science fully coherent with its epistemological
strategies only when we have a feminist society" (quoted
in Ferguson, 1993, p. 13).

I agree with Harding.

Why

can't we take the best from the interpretive and the best
from the genealogical approaches and synthesize a
plausible alternative?
I ask Julia and Virginia to expand a bit more on the
interpretive versus the genealogical approach they intro
duced to me.

Perhaps they could provide the basis for my

own argument for feminist alternative epistemologies in
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my thesis.

Julia explains that the interpretive approach

tends to be a "subject-centered" search for "truth,"
(Ferguson, 1993, p. 14) while the genealogical position
problematizes the notion of subjectivity (Ferguson, 1993,
p. 14).

In this reading of the two perspectives, I tend

to agree with the genealogical position, though initially
I shied away from it because of its biological essential
ism.

Perhaps each of these perspectives has something to

offer my critique of new literary forms.

At any rate,

both the interpretive and the genealogical approaches
reject the traditional, positivistic Truth, which "rests
upon accuracy of correspondence between the name and the
thing" (Ferguson, 1993, p. 17).
Julia, Virginia and I then broaden our discussion
and look at general feminist alternatives to the Western,
patriarchal construction of the subject.

One strategy is

for feminists to demand women be allowed equal entry into
"the world of the human as the dominant discourse defines
it" (Ferguson, 1993, p. 58).

But this is not really an

alternative--it is merely a cry for inclusion (Ferguson,
1993, p. 58).

Sandra Harding calls this "equity femi

nism" (Ferguson, 1993, p. 59).

Julia, Virginia and I all

decide to reject this alternative.
Ferguson posits that an alternative construction of
subjectivity would include a notion of praxis or libera-
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tion for women--the betterment of real life situations
for women (1993, p. 60).
this point.

I very much agree with her on

Again, Ferguson turns to discussions of the

interpretive and the genealogical philosophies for an
swers.

Interpretive would use women's marginality to our

advantage (Ferguson, 1993, p. 60).

In this position, as

articulated by Iris Young, women's oppression is defined
as (quoted in Ferguson, 1993)
the devaluation and repression of women's expe
rience by a masculinist culture that exalts
violence and individualism. It argues for
superiority of values embodied in traditionally
female experience, and rejects the values em
bodied in traditionally male dominated institu
tions.
(p. 61)
One can define "women's experiences" in many ways:
reproductively, politically, biologically, spiritually,
etc. (Ferguson, 1993, p. 61).

Ferguson introduces "prax

is feminism" and claims that " [t]his alternative notion
of subjectivity focuses on persons-in-relations" (Fer
guson, 1993, p. 61).

On the other hand, genealogical

philosophy seeks to explode the binary opposition--i.e.,
male versus female--that underlies both patriarchal and
gynocentric or interpretive constructs of subjectivity
(Ferguson, 1993, p. 61).

Both praxis feminism and genea

logical philosophy appeal to me on this point.
There are pros and cons to both the interpretive and
the genealogical approaches.

I am wary of essentialist
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feminism, and it seems that the roots of the genealogical
approach (as exemplified very strongly by Luce Irigaray)
are no doubt essentialist.

But it seems to me, at the

same time, that the orientation of interpretive subjec
tivity is not quite as potentially_ revolutionary as the
genealogical position.
At any rate, it seems to me that perhaps a combina
tion of these two would be a good start in formulating a
true alternative to positivistic constructions of objec
tivity and subjectivity.

I envision a feminist stew--one

filled with the elements that will constitute a viable
alternative to that offered by the male new literary
forms writers.

I take my yellow legal pad and begin

writing down what I call my Recipe for Feminist Alterna
tives:
1 cup standpoint epistemology (whole); 1 pound
of women's experiences (raw and uncooked); 2
cups self-referential reflexivity; 1 package of
diversity (the multi-racial brand) for color
and flavor; 1 cup dialectical objectivity (make
sure all of the absolute objectivity has been
carefully strained out); 3 cups situated know
ledges; 2 cups partial perspectives (the non
privileged variety); 1/2 cup of essentialism
(the revolutionary brand, only); 1/2 cup each
of the genealogical and the interpretive ap
proaches; omit the equity feminism and the
meat. Stir together in a large kettle and wait
for it to boil.
Julia and Virginia copied down my new recipe and
promised me they would take it back into their feminist
circle and try it out.

CHAPTER IV
EPILOGUE
Reflections:

March, 1995

I recently attended the 9th Annual Midwest Feminist
Conference in Toledo, Ohio.
Allowed/Aloud."

The theme was "Speaking

I learned a lot from my feminist sis

They taught me that we need to work in small ways

ters.

to bring about feminist change--we need to focus on
praxis.

So on the long drive back from Toledo to Kalama

zoo, I did just that .
Handbook Revised, Alternatives Employed
My butt hurts from all of the sitting I have done
this weekend.

And now, to top it all off, I must sit in

this car and drive all the way home to Kalamazoo.

The

woman next to me in the car--a colleague with whom I
presented my paper at the conference--was fast asleep.
This gives me a chance to ponder what I learned from the
women at the conference.

I am thinking specifically

about praxis.
I think of the Ashmore et al. (1995) article, the
one that proved to be an exemplar of male new literary
82

83

forms writing.

The article that was an important cata

lyst for my thesis.

I am intrigued by and enjoy new

literary forms, both reading them and writing them.

So,

how should have Ashmore et al. (1995) have written their
article?
name.

First of all, I think the woman should have a

Without one, she is not given an identity nor a

voice--she is confined to speaking through her male
authors.

Her speech is neither allowed nor aloud.

Ashmore and his buddies should have refrained from
stereotyping their female character.

Though I depict the

character in my thesis doing specifically "feminine"
things--e.g., watching her weight, taking baths, and
being afraid to go out alone at night--Ginny's behavior
was grounded in the reality of Jennifer Boyers' experi
ences.

Because I am a woman writing about a woman, I

believe that I am not stereotyping in the sense that
three men writing about a young woman are.

They have no

direct knowledge of what it is like to be a young woman
working on her thesis, while I do.
Perhaps the Ashmore et al. (1995) article would have
been more effective and less offensive if they would have
used a male character, or even a group of male charac
ters.

It's funny--as I think about all of the stories

I've read in my lifetime, I can barely recall any written
by a woman that have a man or men as her subject(s).

Yet
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how many movies, books, television shows are written
and/or directed by men that have women as the subjects?
The experiential element is crucial, in my opinion, to
writing more honestly.
Jo stirs beside me but does not awaken from her
slumber.

I try not to look directly into the lights of

the oncoming cars in the lane beside me; my night vision
is bad enough already.
those yellow lights.

Sometimes I become mesmerized by
I am suddenly reminded of that

horrible dream in which I was speeding down the Informa
tion Superhighway in a vehicle that was not controlled by
me.
I shudder and think of Julia and Virginia.
with me now?

Are they

I did see them momentarily at one of the

conference sessions dealing with metaphors of food and
lesbian sexual appetites in the work of Butler and Bordo.
But they did not speak to me directly.

I am thankful for

all of the guidance they have provided me with, especial
ly in terms of the feminist critique of new literary
forms.
A joyful feeling overcomes me.
my sisters and I found them.

I went searching for

I look at my hands on the

steering wheel and think to myself, there are no men or
masculine hands controlling this car.
quickly fades.

I smile.

My smile

I remember the recipe I created in my
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apartment with Julia and Virginia.
published in a cookbook?
boil?

Will it ever be

Can it ever truly come to a

Will women ever taste the richness of the stew?

I

continue pondering these questions, as I continue driving
through the night.

ENDNOTES
1

I really hate to do "scientific" documentation with

the citations.

I also find it to be a very masculine

style of writing.

But, my advisor says I have to put

these in to satisfy Western Michigan University's (indeed
all academic institutions' and publications') guideline
requirements.

I decided to place these citations in the

endnotes section because this long list is really quite
boring, plus it is messing up the form of my narrative.
For examples of new literary forms, see:

Ashmore,

1989; Latour, 1980; Mulkay, 1985, 1989; Pfohl, 1990;
Pinch

&

Pinch, 1988; Potter, 1988; Woolgar, 1988b; Wool

gar and Ashmore, 1988.
2

I resign myself to including references in the text.

I'm sure you can see the need for me to use the endnote
here, as I could not very well have scientific references
floating around in Ginny's kitchen.
I use McDonald's here as a symbol of the "McDonaldi
zation" process, or as Ritzer calls it, a "paradigm case"
(1993, p. 1)
ization as:

He defines the larger process of McDonald
The process by which the principles of the

fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and more
sectors of American society as well as the rest of the
86

87
world (1993, p. 1).

Ritzer contends that most all as

pects of life are affected by this McDonaldization process, (interestingly enough, even sex) (1993, p. 8).
3

Of course the Brits hated to include the United

States, because it is common knowledge they think all
Americans are stupid!
4

Self-referring footnotes!

A good example of this is

the Social Science Citation Index (SSCI), in which one
can find references of herself.

I can't wait until I can

reference myself in an article, and then go look up my
own reference to myself in the SSCI, as I'm sure many
writers do.
5

Pinch and Pinch is none other than Trevor Pinch and

Trevor Pinch.

In an extremely clever way, Pinch is

employing the new literary forms technique of "second
voice intervention," in which an argument is began in one
voice and is also simultaneously critiqued by a second
voice.

In this case, both voices belong to Trevor Pinch.

6

McDonald's included, of course.

7

Though I consider myself to be well-versed in gram-

matical issues and the English language, I had to look up
the word dialethia (Webster's II:
sity dictionary, 1984).

New riverside univer

I could not find it.

However, I

did find the word lethe, which is defined as:

"The river

of forgetfulness in Hades; loss of memory" (p. 687).

I
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also looked up the root dia:
372).

"Through or across" (p.

Both are of Greek origin.

So, I deduce that this

term means something to the effect of bridging or over
coming forgetfulness or a loss of memory.
8

This is a perfect example of paradox and irony in

new literary forms writing.

Because he uses the afore

mentioned new literary forms device of second voice
intervention, Pinch is arguing with himself.
9

As you may or may not have guessed, Ginny Wolf is

really Jennifer Boyers.
my experiences.

Most of Ginny's experiences are

Ginny's world is my world.

For example,

I really do live alone, eat meat-flavored vegetarian
burgers, have a great grandmother named Julia Miller
Smith who kept extensive journals, I really have her
desk, and I really do have a "hope chest" given to me by
my grandmother for high school graduation.
part of my feminist critique.
-- she is me.

This is all

Ginny is a real character

This is self-referential reflexivity.

The

nameless woman constructed by Ashmore, Myers, and Potter
(1995) is not real.
10

I was confused with the terminology SSK and ST&S, so

I asked my advisor for some clarification.

(A young and

impressionable female student going to her older, more
distinguished, male mentor for guidance!)
that SSK is part of ST&S.

He tells me
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Of course I had to slip in this reference to my

advisor's book, as it's only the politically correct
thing to do.

Besides, as I mentioned before, I am at

tempting to write this thesis from my own personal
experiences (me meaning Jennifer Sue Boyers), and I
really did get Linden's book (1993) from my advisor.
12

Ironically, the dust cover of Markle's book contains

a quote taken from Linden, commenting on Markle's work.
13

I also had to look up this word in Webster's.

Though specularity was not found, a variation of the word
proved to be very interesting.

Specular is defined as:

"Of, resembling, or produced by a mirror or speculum" (p.
1116).

Because this word was used (or perhaps created)

by essentialist Luce Irigaray, I would not be surprised
if she intentionally sought to make the connection be
tween patriarchal reflexivity, mirrors, and women's
bodies.
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